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Abstract 
The growing complexity of global interconnected risk suggests that a shift has occurred in the 
way emergency planners need to improve preparedness and response to cascading events. 
With reference to the literature from the physical, social and political sciences, this paper 
analyses extreme space weather events and cyberattacks. The goal of this work is to produce 
a replicable scenario-building process, based on cross-disciplinary understanding of 
vulnerability, that could be complementary to probabilistic hazard assessment. Our 
hypothesis is that the technological and human component of critical infrastructure could be 
the primary vector for the escalation of secondary emergencies. While not themselves having 
direct implications in terms of loss of life, elements that are common to different risks could 
provide particular challenges for disaster management. Our findings identify some vulnerable 
nodes, such as Global Navigation Satellite System technology and remote-control systems, 
that could act as paths for the escalations of events. We suggest that these paths may be 
common to various known and unknown threats. We propose two scenarios of Massive, 
OveRwhelming Disruption of OpeRations (M.OR.D.OR.) that could be used for testing 
emergency preparedness strategies, and increasing the response to highly complex, unknown 
events. The conclusions highlight the open challenges of seeking to increase societal 
resilience. The limitations of this work are described, as are the possible challenges for future 
research.  
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Highlights 
 
✓ Cascading events are analysed by identifying vulnerability paths and building scenarios.  
 
✓ A strategy to increase resilience to cascading disasters is presented. 
 
✓ It is argued that different hazards, such as cyberattacks and extreme space weather 
events, can have a similar evolution based on technological and organisational 
vulnerabilities, which make them indirect threats to life and emergency operations. 
 
✓ Common escalation points are identified in the domain of critical infrastructure.  
 
✓ Two scenarios based on extreme space weather events and cyberattacks are proposed, 
which will also help improve resilience to other unknown and low probability risks  
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1. Introduction  
 
The vulnerability of society to cascading events is a major topic of discussion in the scientific 
community. It is now clear that highly interconnected and interdependent systems resulting 
from the technological thrust of globalization are becoming more unstable and harder to 
predict (Helbing 2013). Research funders are allocating a growing amount of money to the 
development of strategies that improve disaster risk reduction. Hence the European 
Commission has supported such efforts with grants allocations in the Seventh Framework 
Programme and Horizon 2020 programmes. Some early research outputs suggested the need 
to go beyond the “toppling dominoes” metaphor, which is associated with an initial event 
that sets off a chain of eventualities (Khan and Abbasi 2000, Reniers 2009). Understanding 
cascading events could have larger implications for modern society because the traditional 
classification of natural, human-made, and hybrid disasters, reported by authors such as 
Shaluf (2007), seems to be an insufficient tool in the face of the high complexity of the 
present-day world. According to Pescaroli and Alexander (2015), cascading disasters can be 
distinguished by non-sequential escalations of secondary emergencies, in which primary 
events are less problematic than the chain of effects triggered by their impact. One of the 
many consequences of this non-sequential process is the disruption of critical infrastructure 
(CI), which can be understood as those assets or systems that are vital to the maintenance of 
social functions via their technological, functional, organizational, and social attributes 
(Alexander 2013b). The process could be associated with failures in preparedness and 
response, and with passages from one state of operations to another in CI. “Normal” routines 
can deal with small disturbances, but they cannot cope when extraordinary measures are 
needed. Consequently, CI can enter into a “crisis” state, in which control is lost and emergency 
procedures are activated that require time and effort to bring the infrastructure back to its 
normal state (Nieuwenhuijs 2008). In this process, the evolution of global technological 
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systems may be one of the risk drivers. Helbing (2013) suggested that current risk analysis 
strategies seem to be inefficient on their own, partly because of problems in dealing with 
coincidences and partly because the processes that integrate event and problem trees are 
considered in a too-unidirectional way. The existing frameworks need to be improved by 
adapting preparedness strategies and deriving better tools for situational awareness in the 
field. Some new analyses of natural hazards and human vulnerabilities have been proposed 
in the literature, but the findings have rarely been used to promote complementary 
approaches to scenario building. 
 
The climate change debate has raised awareness of compound events, which are to be 
understood as the simultaneous or successive combination of multiple physical processes 
(Field et al. 2012). This is the case, for example, when floods happen during a cold snap, or an 
earthquake triggers an avalanche. Analytical processes based on single variables may be 
unable to capture the risk represented by climate extremes, which depend on multiple drivers 
and multiple impacts on the human environment, and which require interdisciplinary 
collaborations in order to be understood (Leonard et al. 2014). Moreover, the literature on 
interconnected hazards places emphasis on interactions among physical dynamics, such as 
the causal mechanisms that develop when earthquakes generate tsunamis (Gill and Malamud 
2014). New multiple-hazard models deal with how to describe interactions, how to assess 
networks, and how to include events such as technological disasters (Gill and Malamud 2016). 
In this context, a branch of the literature has been devoted to analysing the role and 
vulnerabilities of chemical facilities, which can become sources of escalation if they release 
their hazardous materials (Salzano et al. 2009, Krausmann et al. 2011, Antonioni et al. 2015, 
Argenti et al. 2016, van Staalduinen et al 2017). Finally, the technological component of 
society is vulnerable to natural and human-made threats, whose effects are distinguished by 
high levels of uncertainty in prediction and limited examples of large-scale precursors upon 
which to draw (OECD 2011). Because of the disruption of CI and essential services, events that 
are completely different in their nature, such as space weather and cyberattacks, may be able 
to trigger similar effects (Giannopoulos 2012, UK Cabinet 2015).  
 
However, even when risk registers and national strategies make the appropriate 
considerations, the tendency is to separate the categories of risk, and to focus on the triggers 
that are perceived to be most likely to happen and considering static consequences rather 
than the possibility of scaling up secondary events into major disasters. Evidence shows that 
assessment processes are mostly based on probabilistic approaches (Giannopoulos 2012), 
which may be the result of having only limited time series or may simply be ineffective in the 
case of complex events. This is in line with the approach proposed by Linkov et al. (2014), 
which highlighted the need for tools that are complementary to probabilistic risk assessment. 
These authors argued that quantitative risk analysis may be useful for ‘foreseeable and 
calculable stress situations’, while the evolving complexity of networks requires a better 
integration of resilience management. 
 
It has been suggested that cascades may be associated with “black swans” or unknown, high-
impact, low-probability events (Taleb 2007), although this hypothesis has been treated with 
some scepticism. For example, Sornette (2009), who argued that extremes may appear more 
often than is generally expected. The power-law paradigm that is the basis of probabilistic 
risk assessment strategies may miss a population of events, defined as “dragon kings”, which 
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are characterized by amplifying mechanisms that are variable but may be analysed. Since its 
conception, this notion has been tested with evidence from complexity science in order to 
define its practical implications for risk assessment. Although capacity to predict trigger 
events remains limited, it has been demonstrated that cascade effects are most likely to 
develop in the weakest part of the system, where rigidities have accumulated. 
 
According to Pescaroli and Alexander (2016), cascading disasters are distinguished by 
vulnerability paths, which result from the accumulation of unsolved weaknesses in society 
rather than from unexpected, unpredictable primary events. Thus, new preparedness and 
mitigation strategies should include the nodes that, are responsible for escalations, such as 
highly interconnected parts of CI, instead of concentrating merely on primary hazards such as 
floods. Our paper aims to develop this approach further, to provide a complementary view of 
existing risk assessment strategies and to suggest ways of increasing resilience to cascading 
events. Our hypothesis is that the technological component of critical infrastructure tends to 
accumulate rigidities that may be common to both natural and human-made risks. We focus 
on two triggers that are distinguished by high levels of uncertainty and low predictability. 
 
Instead of using high-frequency threats, such as floods, that are well-known direct sources of 
loss of life and are considered routine by the emergency services, we focus on risks that can 
cause only indirect loss of life, such as extreme space weather and cybersecurity. We 
ascertain whether, despite the different nature of the triggers, there could be joint 
vulnerability paths that generate similar cascading escalations in the state of individual or 
compound risk drivers. We suggest that both extreme space weather events and well-
targeted cyberattacks induce societies in highly-developed countries to be vulnerable to 
scenarios of Massive, Overwhelming, Disruption of Operations (acronym M.OR.D.OR.). Our 
goal is to point out which actions are needed in order to increase the flexibility management 
of response and resilience for these stressors and others that cannot be predicted with clarity.  
 
In the following section, we develop this idea, assuming that cross-disciplinary studies are 
needed in order to characterise fast-evolving socio-technological systems and complex 
accidents (Rasmussen 1997). We review the literature in order to develop a consistent 
process of scenario building, whose methodological building blocks can be found in the work 
of Alexander (2000, 2016). First, we define the role of CI in cascading events. Secondly, we 
proceed towards a vulnerability scenario and we apply the concept of vulnerability paths to 
extreme space weather and cyberattacks. For reasons of feasibility and clarity, we focus on 
the technological and organisational components of CI, while more detailed, rigorous analysis 
would also include the societal, economic, and institutional or “soft infrastructure” response. 
In conclusion, we formulate the M.OR.D.OR. scenario, discuss its practical implications and 
offer some open questions for future researches. 
 
 
2. Critical Infrastructure, networks and cascading events 
 
The national definitions of CI and its sectors have changed in response to the complexity of 
the built environment and society, and changes in strategic needs (Lazari 2014). The 
importance of some assets, such as aqueducts, has been known since Roman times, and has 
evolved in different phases of history, e.g. the protection of power plants during the Cold War 
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(Setola et al. 2017). However, the possible impact of CI disruption is increasing considerably 
with the growing role of information technology, privatisation, urbanisation, and networked 
dependencies between services. In the late 1990s, the Clinton administration recognised this 
trend through Presidential Decision Directive PDD-63, which facilitates dialogue with nations 
such as Canada (Setola et al. 2017). 
Some key events have pushed and pulled practitioners towards a new approach to CI 
protection, including the terrorist attacks in New York (2001), London (2005) and Madrid 
(2004), as well as major disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 (Lazari 2014). Nowadays, it has been widely recognized that CI is a 
determinant of potential cross-border and cascading crises (Egan 2007, Boin and Mc Connell 
2007, Ansell et al. 2010, Lazari 2014, Setola et al. 2017). Loss of services and cascading failures 
can be unintentional and may be triggered, for example, by environmental hazards. 
Alternatively, it could be the fruit of intentional attacks on vulnerable interconnected 
networks (Wang et al. 2013). Work by Rinaldi et al. (2001) can be considered seminal in the 
evolution of this field. These authors suggested that forms of CI may interact according to 
their location in both geographical and cyberspace, their capabilities (e.g. pumping capacity), 
and their memory (e.g. degradation by use). They can be visualized in terms of the resources 
used (inputs) and the products created (outputs). CI evolves and reflects interaction with the 
whole system, in terms of its political, environmental, economic and social components 
(Rinaldi et al. 2001). In other words, the technological components cannot be separated from 
the human components that develop, manage and maintain them, as shown in Figure 1. 
According to Little (2002), the functional linkages become tightly coupled in vulnerable nodes, 
in which different attributes are concentrated, as follows: (a) the hardware, such as 
transmission lines, servers and satellites; (b) the software, such as information systems; and 
(c) the services provided, the public that uses them and the background determinants of 
decision making. However, sectors such as energy, telecommunication and transportation are 
not made up of self-standing assets. Instead, they are mainly connected to larger networks 
that are complex, dispersed and subject to multiple threats, such as natural hazards and 
terrorist outrages (Amin 2002). 
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Figure 1. Critical infrastructure as a node between cyberspace, physical space, technology 
and society. 
The development of CI in the built environment is associated with technological and 
managerial components that could generate cascading disruptions, even without a direct and 
evident physical connection (Hellstrom 2007). Due to the complexity of their networks, 
smaller failures can recombine into cross-scale cascading events, thus increasing the impact 
of local disasters upon broader crises (Egan 2007). Non-sequential effects and cascades are 
determined by shifting dependencies, which vary according to changes in the mode of 
operation that result from disruptions or failures (Nieuwenhuijs 2008). This has very practical 
implications because infrastructure breakdowns go beyond the routine forms of contingency 
planning and emergency response. They require new strategies for coping with worst-case 
scenarios and training to facilitate cooperation across functional borders and hierarchical 
levels (Boin and McConnell 2007). 
 
A particular approach to CI disruption can escalate into secondary crisis that exceeds the 
original trigger and propagates emergencies in time and space, for example when localized 
floods damage a communications hub that serves a whole region (Pescaroli and Alexander 
2015). The non-sequential nature of this type of event can affect both the delivery of disaster 
relief and the coordination of emergency response. Pescaroli and Kelman (2017) compared 
three case studies in which international relief was deployed in highly-developed countries, 
and found that CI affected the supply of and demand for goods and expertise. The cascades 
generated by secondary emergencies were visible in the rapidity with which supply and 
demand were scaled up in response to the loss of services (e.g. meals ready to eat in response 
to lack of electricity). This also pertained to the hazardous component of CI (e.g. the supply 
of dosimeters in the face of nuclear meltdown). In order to understand these results, two 
different aspects must be considered: the direct effects of CI disruption in terms of the loss 
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of services and function; and the indirect effects derived from the hazardous nature of the CI, 
such as environmental pollution or contamination (Alexander 2013b). In the first case, the 
literature shows that accidents involving energy, telecommunications and Internet disruption 
are more diffuse than might be expected, and they can become drivers of cascades in other 
sectors (Luiijf et al. 2009, Van Eeten et al. 2011). Recent grants by the European Commission 
have supported the improvement of methodologies for assessing these aspects of cascades, 
in order to understand the interconnectivity  and interdependencies among infrastructure 
types (e.g. Hassel et al. 2014).  
 
CI disruptions also have indirect effects that may require specialised emergency efforts and 
are associated with vulnerable equipment in industrial and chemical facilities. On the one 
hand, researchers have considered the implications when natural hazards trigger 
technological accidents ('NaTech' events), which show how events such as floods, 
earthquakes and lightning can generate dispersion of toxic materials, contamination, fires and 
explosions (Krausmann et al. 2011). This has affected mitigation and planning strategies in 
different ways. For instance, in creating early warning systems, probabilistic hazard analysis 
has been applied with fragility curves of industrial equipment (Salzano et al. 2009). 
Probabilistic equipment failures and the recurrence of hazardous releases in risk-prone areas 
have been used to implement safety measures (Antonioni et al. 2015). On the other hand, 
the indirect effects of the disruption of chemical facilities can be caused by human-made 
threats and in particular terrorism. The possibility of attacks has been measured through 
functional risk assessments designed to integrate the likelihood of threats and potential 
losses (van Staalduinen et al 2017), while new models have been created in order to define 
the performance of countermeasures and protection systems (Argenti et al. 2016). 
 
Both direct and indirect effects of CI disruptions can spread a crisis across local, national and 
trans-national scales of space and jurisdiction, across short, medium and long timescales, and 
among the populations involved (Pescaroli and Alexander 2016). Although CI failures can 
increase the pressure on the response system, the capacity to adapt to the evolution of crises 
may be limited by problems of coordination, competency, mobilisation and communication 
(Ansell et al. 2010). This is exacerbated by the fact that risk maps that include loss of CI and 
its impacts are generally unavailable or are not uniform because they separate natural and 
technological hazards or overlay them without taking heed of context (De Groeve et al. 2013). 
Even when innovative methodologies of CI risk assessment are considered, such as that 
produced by Kadri et al. (2014), attention remains focused on the sources of danger and the 
sequence generated after the failures, without including possible existing fragilities as 
variables. This is not necessarily wrong, but it could usefully be reinforced with 
complementary approaches. Helbing et al. (2015) suggested that the high variability of 
networks and the complexity of cascade effects may represent a real challenge to crisis 
management. These authors emphasise the need to increase the autonomy and adaptive 
capacity of all the components in the systems, and to influence planning and decision making 
with more equitable, decentralized approaches. The next section suggests how vulnerability 
paths and scenarios can be derived from the technological assets of CI.  
 
3. Steps toward a vulnerability scenario for cascading events  
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The likelihood of worst-case scenarios associated with the interaction of compound events, 
interconnected risk, and cascading crises may be elucidated with three examples: the 
eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (2010), the triple disaster in Japan (2011), and Hurricane Sandy 
(2012).  
 
In the first case, Eyjafjallajökull produced an ash cloud that shut down air transportation over 
70 per cent of Europe (Alexander 2013). The European authorities were unprepared for the 
event, having anticipated limited primary physical impacts in Iceland but not the escalation to 
the economic and social domains that depend highly on international mobility. This scenario 
saw the coincidence between volcanic activity and a north-to-northwest air flow from Iceland 
to Europe, which is rare but recurs approximately 6% of the time (Sammonds et al. 2010). The 
lack of preparedness was one of the escalating factors in the crisis and, despite the existence 
of well-known precursors throughout the world, volcanic ash clouds were not included in the 
risk registers of many countries, including the United Kingdom (Alexander 2013).  
 
In the second case, the triple disaster that struck northeast Japan in 2011 involved one of the 
most prepared nations in the world and offers different levels of lessons to learn. The impact 
of the earthquake was limited by pre-existing mitigation measures, but it triggered a tsunami 
that caused approximately 18,000 deaths (National Diet of Japan 2012). The vulnerability of 
national CI was a determinant in the scaling up of the emergency, as millions of citizens were 
left without vital supplies and relief was difficult to deliver without lifelines. The electricity 
transmission line between the Fukushima Dai'ichi Nuclear Power Plant and the national grid 
was severed by a small landslide caused by the tsunami, while the emergency diesel 
generators were directly damaged by the tsunami. This resulted in a nuclear meltdown that 
the authorities have recognized as a human-made disaster (National Diet of Japan 2012).  
 
Our third example is that of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which struck an area that was rich in CI. 
The hurricane caused a storm surge on the coast but soon electrical power outages became 
the driver of another crisis, which in turn lasted up to two weeks and required the White 
House to take extreme measures, such as the use of oil reserves. An estimated 72 fatalities 
were directly associated with the hurricane, while another 50 deaths were estimated to be 
the result of the extended power outages and ensuing cold weather (Blake et al. 2013).  
 
These cases show forms of interaction and compound risk, which tends to be amplified 
consistently by the vulnerability of CI. According to Perrow (1999), multiple-system accidents 
are inevitable in highly complex technological systems, and they can be triggered by 
unexpected interacting failures. This is especially the case in cascading events, where cross-
scale vulnerabilities are accumulated in CI to the extent that they reveal pre-existing paths 
that become visible when the breaking points in social, political and ecological systems are 
aligned (Pescaroli and Alexander 2016). Despite being unpredictable, those rigidities are well 
rooted in society’s feedback loops, which can be exacerbated by practices of mismanagement 
and production pressure (negative feedback), or reduced by good practices and adaptation 
policies (positive feedback). Scenario building could help to increase the sharing of 
information on CI dependencies that are mostly known only to technical personal, such as 
engineers and facility mangers. Scenarios can identify escalation points that in complex 
events may lead to increased demand for assistance and coordination (Alexander 2016). By 
way of example, some governmental actors in the UK have created a methodology that 
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involves scenario exercises and aims to increase the awareness and information sharing on CI 
interdependencies in generic urban environments (Hogan 2013). Even if the uncertainty 
levels of a non-sequential chain of effects remain elevated and hard to predict, the process 
may help to explore the concurrent, compound and cascading drivers of the escalation 
process. In the literature, there is widespread recognition of the importance of preparedness 
practices and planning in increasing the flexibility of responses and adopting good practices, 
even when experience is lacking (e.g. Kartez and Lindell 1987). Scenarios have been used in 
teaching emergency management, in running exercises and in conducting national risk 
assessments because they can help “anticipate the unforeseen” and reveal possible impact 
and limitations inherent in sudden evolution of the emergency (Alexander 2000). The 
“building blocks” of this process include the definition of the nature of the crisis, which 
constitutes a starting framework. They will require a rapid and reasoned reaction on the part 
of emergency managers. Hence, it is not surprising that a great deal of methodology has been 
developed to study the interaction of vulnerability and hazard.  
 
Scenarios can be derived from past events, or they can explore hypothetical future risks and 
test capacity to define innovative strategies and new tactical approaches (Alexander 2002). 
The first elements to define are the so called “boundary conditions”, which propose the 
hazard input (e.g. a magnitude 7 earthquake) and the inputs of vulnerability (e.g. the building 
stock, aggregate patterns of activities, and so on). The scenario then proceeds through a 
series of stages, which can be used to identify emergency needs and the possible contingency 
planning parameters, thus providing a series of answers to the question “what could happen 
if…” (Alexander 2002). Similarly, scenarios are one major tool to define connections between 
and among the various components of system, in particular the amplifiers that increase the 
risk for other components (OECD 2011). This process is vital for threats whose impacts are 
distinguished by high levels of uncertainty, e.g. the sensitivity of high-tech infrastructure to 
geomagnetic storms and other forms of 'space weather' (OECD 2011). Scenarios may benefit 
from the assessment of common vulnerability paths shared with unknown threats. If 
vulnerability is regarded as latent susceptibility of a system, it can be understood via the 
analysis of known risks and possible causal roots that are concentrated in the linkages 
between components of subsystems, such as those in the built environment (Birkmann et al. 
2014). For instance, assessment of the vulnerability of CI can be accomplished through overall 
analysis of vulnerability, of the kind that determines the efficiency of the overall network, and 
by component analysis, as in the assessment of those nodes and edges that are the most 
crucial to the operational capacity of the system (Wang et al. 2013). 
 
A complementary approach is the one suggested by Linkov et al. (2014), who proposed an 
operational matrix for assessing the resilience of critical infrastructure, including the physical, 
informational, cognitive and social domains. In this case, the technological components of CI 
have multi-dimensional and cross-cutting aspects that cannot be separated from the political 
and social implications of dealing with disruption or worse. Finally, it must be noted that the 
resilience of CI can also be interpreted as the ability of reliability experts to elaborate 
contingency scenarios as situations and challenges evolve, thus breaking through the barriers 
of formal design (Schulman and Roe 2007). The technological and human drivers are deeply 
interrelated in the way that they determine the magnitude of possible failures. Because it 
represents the most advanced component of CI, space-based infrastructure can be used as 
an example of this bonding. The 1998 failure of the Galaxy IV satellite caused 80 per cent of 
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digital pagers in the United States to go offline. It compromised ATM transactions, credit card 
authorizations, and cable and broadcast transmissions (Little 2002). The current situation is 
that orbital infrastructure has become essential to communication, geospatial positioning, 
environmental monitoring, data linkages and defence, which raises concerns about its 
vulnerability to threats such as cyberattacks (Livingstone and Lewis 2016). Emergency 
management itself cannot be immune to the problems of cascading effects where disruption 
affects ground-based infrastructure, especially since the 1990s tools that make use of satellite 
technology have become widely adopted (Alexander 2000). 
 
Information and communications technology (ICT) connects all disaster response systems, 
including emergency services and military command–control structures along with energy 
supply and transportation lifelines (Hellstrom 2007). Nowadays, failure of the Internet and 
communications services have the potential to ‘disconnect’ the population from emergency 
response, holding back the delivery of information and guidance during major adverse events 
(Sommer and Brown 2011). Because of reciprocal feedback, such complexities may 
accumulate fragilities in the relationship between packet transportation networks (PTNs) and 
the Internet, given that the Internet needs computer networking and PTNs need energy, 
satellite communications and cables. At the broader level, it has been suggested that the 
evolving role of technology has added new layers of vulnerability to CI, creating new 
challenges in maintaining balanced security efforts (Lazari 2014). The following sections 
address the boundary conditions for extreme space weather and cybersecurity, respectively, 
which are then used to develop a common perspective on the discussion.  
 
 
4. Boundary conditions: extreme space weather events  
 
Space weather is the term used to describe changing ambient conditions in outer space that 
affect the Earth (Eastwood 2008, Hapgood 2010, Hapgood and Thomson 2010). The Sun 
drives space weather, which varies with solar activity on a roughly 11-year cycle, usually 
tracked by counting the number of sunspots visible on the Sun. The maximum level of solar 
activity typically coincides with the largest number of sunspots visible on the Sun. The Sun 
drives extreme space weather in a number of ways, including solar fares, coronal mass 
ejections and geomagnetic storms:  
 
(a) Solar flares are emissions of UV light, X-rays and particle radiation, typically over a 
period of minutes to hours.  
 
(b) Coronal mass ejections (CMEs) are the explosive release of a large mass of the solar 
atmosphere at once. CMEs are often associated with sunspots and solar flares. Earth-
directed CMEs that travel faster than 1000 km/sec take between 1 and 3 days to reach 
the Earth and push a shockwave in front of them that generates high-energy particle 
radiation.  
 
(c) Geomagnetic storms are the response of the Earth's magnetosphere to rapid changes 
in pressure or magnetic field direction in the solar wind. The most extreme 
geomagnetic storms are caused when CMEs hit the Earth due to the very large 
changes in pressure and magnetic field driven by the CME. When a geomagnetic storm 
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occurs, energy that has been stored in the Earth's magnetic field is released and causes 
the acceleration of ions and electrons to high-energies, which are stored in the 
radiation belts, and generates intense currents in the ionosphere.  
 
Radiation from solar flares, CMEs and geomagnetic storms causes ionization and heating of 
the top layers of the atmosphere, disrupting radio communications and increasing the drag 
on low-altitude satellites, such as GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) and scientific 
mapping satellites, decreasing their lifetime in orbit. This radiation can disrupt GNSS service 
and satellite operations, harm astronauts, while some avionics equipment on board aircraft 
can suffer failures. Energetic particles in the radiation belts can as well damage satellites, 
disrupt the electronics on board and degrade the performance of solar panels reducing the 
profitability and performance of the satellites. Electrical currents generated in the ionosphere 
cause electrical currents on the ground via induction. These ground induced currents (GICs) 
travel through highly conducting material, if possible, which are typically high-voltage power 
lines, pipes, railways and other, metallic CI. The main risk associate with GIC is disruption of 
high-voltage electrical distribution networks in national power grids. The GIC enters and exits 
the grid via transformers and as it travels through these important CI nodes, causes the 
voltage cycle to drift outside the designed tolerance regime for the system. When this 
happens, eddy currents are generated in the transformer and half-cycle saturation can occur, 
heating the transformer core. This typically does not directly destroy the transformer, but can 
cause safety circuits to activate and disconnect the transformer from the grid. Thus, cascading 
blackouts can occur. There is some evidence that repeated heating via GIC that does not trip 
safety features reduces the operational lifetime of transformers. GIC may also cause the loss 
of phase-coherence across a large grid, also tripping safety features and potentially causing 
regional blackouts. 
 
Extreme space weather is a newly recognized risk to human life and technology, having been 
added to the risk registers of the USA and UK over the last ten years (BIS 2015, Fry 2012). The 
risk is typically characterized as impacting technological CI, especially satellites, power 
transmission equipment and radio communications, and possibly disrupting global air 
transportation. Space weather affects the whole Earth and so can be considered a global 
phenomenon, but the most intense effects are localized to a region of a few hundred to a few 
thousand kilometres in size, typically in the high northern or southern latitudes. There are a 
number of documented historical cases of extreme space weather; all are thought to be due 
to very large geomagnetic storms caused by fast CMEs and very energetic flares. The first 
observation of such an extreme space weather event was in 1859 by Richard Carrington 
(Cliver 2013), but subsequent events have been recorded roughly every ten years (Kilpua 
2015). The most recent extreme space weather events were a power blackout and damage 
to high-voltage transformers in Canada and the northeastern USA in 1989 and the loss of a 
satellite and interruption of service on many others during October and November 2003 
(Kappenman 2005). In the first case, a geomagnetic storm triggered a power outage of more 
than nine hours, which was exacerbated by the lack of availability of replacement parts and 
was contained with the voluntary reduction of power use by industrial sites, causing damages 
estimated at US$6 billion (OECD 2011). Space weather has also been connected to damage 
to power transformers in South Africa (Gaunt 2007), instabilities in power transmission lines 
over the USA (Forbes 2012) and in Spain, and to air traffic control failures in Sweden and the 
USA. 
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The typical scale of these past events has been for power cuts to last about one day, radio 
communications disruption to last a few days and with satellite operations disruption every 
ten years (Dobbins and Schriiver 2015). The literature provides much additional evidence of 
the cascading consequences of power failures and air travel disruption (Ansell et al. 2010, 
Alexander 2013, Pescaroli and Alexander 2015), but the primary impact of extreme space 
weather involves CI in outer space and the cybernetworks that they support. In particular, the 
consequences of inaccuracy or failure of GNSS have not been studied in great detail. GNSS 
receivers are now commonly found in all manner of devices, from mobile phones, to watches, 
cars, farming equipment, the avionics of aircraft and self-driving cars, aircraft autopilots and 
ship navigation. Some of these are thoroughly reliant on GNSS. It has been integrated into 
financial systems, as modern high-speed trading on the stock markets are timed by GNSS 
signals. A failure in GNSS, or a period of increased inaccuracy, could be caused by extreme 
solar flares, CMEs or geomagnetic storms (Cannon et al., 2013). The likely impact on these 
systems is unknown. 
 
Each industry has a different approach to managing the risks of space weather (BIS 2015). On 
the one hand, the satellite industry is the most aware of the issues because it is forced to 
react to these events more than are other CI providers, but the satellite industry tends not to 
share its knowledge or engage in dialogue with other sectors. On the other hand, the addition 
of extreme space weather to the National Risk Register in the UK in 2012 has meant that the 
National Grid and UK energy providers are improving their response plans. However, there is 
still much uncertainty about what could be the most cost-effective measures to promote. For 
example, the OECD (2011) suggested that for electricity generation companies and utilities it 
would not be economically sustainable to harden all transmission lines, but a possible strategy 
could be to focus efforts on the transformers between the generation facilities, and on the 
transmission grids, in order to increase the speed with which the network is restored. 
 
To our knowledge, the risk of extreme space weather concurrent with another ongoing 
disaster or crisis has not been studied at all and could have important consequences. Air 
travel, satellite observations, GPS information and radio communications are all used to 
coordinate modern responses, and disruption to these services could potentially have 
important consequences for response to other emergencies. Although a compounding event 
of the intensity needed to provoke a cascading scenario must be considered infrequent, it 
remains in the range of plausible risk, and the ability to forecast it could be limited by the high 
uncertainty that is common in most long-term prediction of natural cycles. The likelihood that 
a space weather event will coincide with another disaster must thus be taken into account at 
the global level, as disasters and crises are a recurrent part of modern society and extremes 
are expected phenomena.  
 
 
 5. Boundary conditions: cybersecurity issues  
 
Cyberspace is more than the World Wide Web or the Internet itself. It is an “artificial 
dimension”, created by humans and made possible by the convergence of three “layers” 
(some say more): the physical layer, a logical (or syntactic) layer sitting above the first, and, 
sitting on top, a semantic layer (Libicki 2009). The first, physical, layer is made of all the 
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computers, cables, routers, and so on that support the rest. The logical layer contains the 
algorithms, protocols and software that, like the physical, make cyberspace function. Finally, 
the semantic layer displays the content, data and information that makes cyberspace 
meaningful for the vast majority of human users. It is fair to say that cyberspace is complex 
and puzzling and this is the result of the many projects that have created it, many if not most 
of which are independent of one another. The topology of cyberspace is also highly volatile, 
as 'regions' may appear or disappear on command or under attack from cyber- or 
conventional sources. Critical infrastructures are like the "nerves and blood vessels" of 
societies and their economies. Without them most social and economic activities would 
cease. They used to be mostly 'physical', but in the mid-1990s the private sector found out 
that it would be much more efficient to manage the infrastructures via computer networks, 
thus they became critical information infrastructures, which now extend across all three 
layers and are an indispensable element of cyberspace. Clearly, as large and complex systems, 
if they break down, they may provoke catastrophic effects (De Bruijne and Van Eeten 2007, 
Hellstrom 2007, Perrow 1999). The list of critical information infrastructures may vary, 
depending on the country or institution considered, but they all tend to include banking and 
finance, transportation and distribution, energy, public utilities (gas, water, sewerage etc.), 
health, food supply, communications and key government services (Abele-Wigert and Dunn 
2006). 
 
In cybersecurity, the literature is ample and tends to focus on lack of preparedness in 
advanced societies (e.g. Clarke and Knake 2011, Schwartau 1994). It also focusses on other 
issues (Giacomello 2013), such as the motives for launching cyberattacks (Rid 2013, Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt 1993), and, last but not least, the impact of cyberattacks on vital public functions 
(Hellstrom 2007). It is also recognised that only state-actors with their superior resources can 
engage in strategic cyberattacks, as only they have the capacity to seriously hamper their 
enemy's activities (Kaplan 2016, Rid 2013). In the case of an attack by a technically proficient 
state, there is not much the target can do, as attacks in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), Iran 
(2009) and Ukraine (2015) showed, but this is also rare, and it is outside the scope of the 
present paper. However, cyberterrorists could sabotage infrastructure as a 'force multiplier', 
which can boost the effects of, say, a conventional attack, such as blocking emergency 
services in order to elevate the number of victims of a car bomb (Matusitz and Minei 2009). 
A cyber-'force multiplier' for terrorists offers opportunities for mitigation, although these 
have not been exploited significantly (Giacomello 2004; Jarvis et al. 2014). At the risk of 
simplification, cyberwarrior states may have the resources and capacity to destroy the 
interconnected CI system of a target country, regardless of how they exploit cascading effects. 
Non-state actors with more limited resources, mostly terrorists but perhaps also anarchist 
"hacktivists", may be drawn into causing a specific infrastructure to 'crash', which in turn may 
disrupt other CI, thus capitalising for their political goals on cascading effects as force 
multipliers. Given this distinction, it is not surprising that one of the earliest efforts in the 
United States to assess the vulnerability of CI, the Presidential Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, came to the conclusion that, because of growing complexity and 
interdependence, even “minor and routine disturbance can cascade into a regional outage” 
(Marsh 1997 - emphasis added). 
 
For non-state actors, the most disruptive course of action seems to be a focus on electricity, 
information and communications technologies (ICT) and possibly also on emergency services. 
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As was quickly recognized for the first of these, "prolonged disruption in the flow of energy 
would seriously affect every infrastructure" (Marsh 1997: 12). Chai et al. (2008: 269) 
demonstrated the primacy of electricity and ICT as “the most important critical 
infrastructures, in terms of their contribution to infrastructure interdependency, thus 
vulnerability.” The geographical scale and duration of interruptions of those CI would depend 
on a number of factors, but mostly on access to skills, finance and intelligence by the 
attackers. The more of this, the greater the damage. Portable EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) 
tools would probably be included. Nevertheless, the greatest assistance to attackers would 
come from the fragmented organizational structure of CI, which is not only divided between 
public and private sectors, but the latter is, in turn, made of different stakeholders who not 
always cooperate and sometimes, despite good intentions, may even compete with one 
another (Kaplan 2016, De Bruijne and Van Eeten 2007). In particular, the organization of 
cybersecurity in space lacks global coherence, and is distinguished by problems of 
communication regarding access to high-level classified information (Livingstone and Lewis 
2016).  
Again, the GNSS is a key example of a CI asset in space that, if compromised, would disrupt 
services over large geographical areas. As the Global Positioning System (GPS) became the 
United States’ sole GNSS, it was thus almost inevitable that the exclusive reliance on it, 
combined with other complex interdependencies, would raise the potential for single point 
failure and cascading effects (Marsh 1997: A19). As noted above, it is difficult to estimate the 
possible extent of an induced disruption, as many intervening variables may affect the 
outcome.  
Nevertheless, we will consider energy grid disruptions in the United States over the last 15 
years as examples of wide-spread disruptions. The data are openly available from various 
sources and give interesting insights.i Over that period, 20 per cent of disrupting events were 
attributed to physical and cybervandalism, which is the second most common cause of 
damage after severe weather. While it would clearly be wrong to associate this figure with 
one for cyberattacks, we should consider that it is only relatively more difficult to accomplish 
damage via cyberspace than it is by vandalism, but the former is far less risky for the 
perpetrators than the latter. These conditions make it necessary to include cyberattacks in 
the M.OR.D.OR. scenario. 
 
6. Discussion: the M.OR.D.OR. scenario 
Although common vulnerability may exist in CI, extreme space weather events and 
cybersecurity have rarely been used together to build scenarios. In general, such events and 
factors can trigger similar cascading effects as those associated with CI disruption. They 
represent an indirect threat to life more than a direct one (OECD 2011, UK Cabinet 2015). 
Buckerfield de la Roche (2013) reported an attempt to create a dialogue on the common 
issues of outer space and cyberspace in two conferences held in 2012, which brought 
together specialists from 15 countries. As the vulnerability of space-based assets is increasing 
rapidly, better collaboration, cooperation and information sharing are required. New forms 
of governance are needed in order to cover the expansion of infrastructure, but there is some 
concrete risk that both outer space and cyberspace could be perceived as militarized, and 
that this could hamper if not reduce information sharing. Similarly, cyber-technology has an 
emerging value, is constantly updated and has multiple uses and purposes, which increases 
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the risk that it will be treated inadequately in legislation (Livingston and Lewis 2016). Despite 
early attempt to link extreme space weather and cybersecurity in policies on European CI, 
they remain largely without a perspective of common integration (Lazari 2014). 
 
Here, we argue that there is a link between cyber- and space weather risk by adopting the 
approach of vulnerability paths suggested by Pescaroli and Alexander (2016). The 
technological nodes of CI accumulate fragilities in political, behavioural and managerial 
components that have common triggers that could escalate in cascading disasters. This should 
not be considered only in term of CI interconnectivity and interdependencies, but should also 
be dealt with in the practice of emergency management and planning.  
  
The literature reported in previous sections suggested that common vulnerability paths exist 
in emerging technologies such as GPS and satellite infrastructure. In line with the model 
adopted by Hellstrom (2007), these are more likely to be vulnerable because they accumulate 
root causes and dynamic pressures that contribute to the creation and amplification of unsafe 
conditions in the intersection of information systems, human drivers and the physical 
components of CI. On the one hand, nothing excludes the very same components being 
vulnerable, simply because there is a lack of information sharing, to other known or unknown 
risks. On the other hand, the differences between the full breakdown of the system and the 
need to contain the scaling up could be inherent in the flexibility and adaptation capacity of 
the responders and of society. In other words, the problems related to the human component 
of CI, meaning political and managerial decision making, are likely to be affected in the same 
way if a high level of uncertainty and lack of information are not compensated for by training 
and preparedness strategies (Kartez and Lindell 1987, Little 2002, Boin and Mc Connell 2007, 
Schulman and Roe 2007, Ansell et al. 2010, Alexander 2000, 2002, 2016).  
 
In terms of scenario building, the vulnerability paths of both extreme space weather and 
cybersecurity define a type of scenario that we call Massive, Overwhelming, Disruption of 
Operations (acronym M.OR.D.OR.), as shown in Figure 2. Here, the crisis could result from 
highly complex cascades that are triggered by threats, which are not fully appreciated by 
emergency managers and which escalate as they incorporate the technological components 
of CI (Amin 2002, Little 2002, Hellstrom 2007, Boin and McConnell 2007, Egan 2007, Helbing 
2013, Alexander 2016). In other words, both extreme space weather and cybersecurity could 
highlight vulnerable nodes in physical and cyber-dimensions that could be rooted in negative 
social feedback, such as production pressure on large-scale networks. The lack of (knowledge 
about) precursors could limit the capacity to react of the same decision makers, who may find 
themselves in a condition of high uncertainty. However, adopting the perspective of Sornette 
(2009), the worst case could be worse than what is expected. It could be possible that 
cascades driven by the technological components of CI could re-combine with compounding 
dynamics such as those described by Leonard et al. (2014). A scenario in which an initial event 
of random intensity, such as a local or regional flood, happens to coincide with a technological 
based escalation remains possible. It has been suggested that shocks originating in the cyber-
domain could be triggered by attacks on CI that happen during another crisis, and which could 
limit the capacity of technicians to activate protection measures (Sommer and Brown 2011). 
The notion that cascading disasters could be the result of an accumulation of rigidities and 
cycles in different systems reinforces the need to integrate resilience management with risk 
assessment (Helbing 2013, 2015, Linkov et al. 2014, Pescaroli and Alexander 2016). 
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Figure 2: Massive OveRwhelming Disruption of OpeRations scenario.  
We present two example scenarios of the type of scenarios that fit in the definition of 
MO.R.D.OR.: 
(a) In the first scenario, extreme space weather events or cyberattacks happen on their 
own and spread towards a technological network in physical space, as reported in 
official risk registers such as that of the UK Cabinet Office (2015). The existence of 
common vulnerability paths could be used to test the flexibility and adaptability of 
response to the highly uncertain escalation of secondary emergencies determined by 
CI disruptions, when the identification of the trigger could itself be a source of doubt 
that could shut down ordinary procedures (Pescaroli and Alexander 2016). The 
development of a scenario for emergency management would focus on how to 
maintain the continuity of services, for example, in the case of the breakdown of 
vulnerable nodes, as in GPS failures, with a need to determine which actions should 
have priority in order to minimize the disruption of the social fabric. There are key 
issues regarding the role of shared knowledge about which sectors to concentrate on 
in recovery as a matter of priority. There also needs to be common legislation and 
policies that attribute roles and responsibilities, even when the scenarios carry a high 
level of uncertainty. This may be particularly relevant in the case of events that do not 
represent a direct physical threat to life, but which may result in indirect losses due to 
the escalating disruption of services.  
 
(b) M.OR.D.OR. could potentially be considered a knock-down event in which emergency 
management is required to act against a well-known threat to life and also scale up 
processes in the cyber-dimension. In the case of extreme space weather, this stems 
from the coincidence of natural cycles of the sun, and earth dynamics, such as those 
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described by Field et al. (2012). Alternatively, as noted by Sommer and Brown (2011), 
cybersecurity may result from well-targeted, human-made decisions. These may 
exploit rigidities, mismanagement or conflicting policies in the social domain. In both 
cases, scenarios focus on the conflicting needs of fast response to an initial, well-
known emergency and the partial or total loss of the technological component of 
emergency response. We need to address the priority actions required to contain 
further scaling up, mainly by adapting tools and procedures to maintain basic 
operational capacity during a possible high-impact technological loss.  
 
Clearly, both scenarios imply high uncertainty in the extension of service disruption through 
short, medium and long spatial and temporal scales. The testing of the scenarios should 
consider different levels of impact (local, regional, national and transnational). It should also 
be differentiated by the level of criticality of the disruption of CI with particular respect to 
interconnected and interdependent services. Better system design and management can 
have a strong influence upon the process (Helbing 2015). The development of guidelines and 
training that could be used in adverse circumstances could also be of help. After the impact 
of the triggers, the worst escalation drivers could be related to the human dimension of 
mismanagement or to lack of training, which has been reported in the work by Rasmussen 
(1997), in research about high-reliability CI (Schulman and Roe 2007), and in the frameworks 
for cascading disasters and interconnected risks. Similarly, as reported in section 3, the 
potential impact on CI of external events could be reduced by improving the awareness of 
decision makers about the possible protection systems that are available and about the 
criteria for designing CI in a safer way.  
 
In conclusion, it must be noted that M.OR.D.OR. is far from being an exercise in ‘crying wolf’. 
The very same conditions that occurred during the 2003 blackouts in Europe and northeast 
America might seem improbable if we merely change their trigger in the description of the 
scenario (Schulman and Roe 2007). This episode highlighted the vulnerability of shipping to 
electronic interference through GNSS. It disrupted operations in several ports, and required 
personnel to go "back to basics" and do everything on paper (Saul 2017). Something similar 
also happened in South Korea in 2016, when signals were jammed and hundreds of fishing 
vessels had to return to their ports (Saul 2017). Moreover, in September 2017, the strongest 
solar flare in 12 years degraded radio and GPS communications on one side of the planet 
(Crane 2017) while Hurricane Irma was challenging emergency services across the Atlantic 
coasts in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. (While there is at the time of writing no evidence that 
this complicated the deployment of relief, the hemisphere affected was the very same one.) 
M.OR.D.OR. might be a remote possibility, but history is full of low-probability, high-impact 
events that have happened in real life. In order to produce some clear answers about the 
possible levels of flexibility and adaptation in the response capacity, this scenario, we argue, 
should be developed and applied in real exercises with emergency managers and CI providers. 
We also argue that the opportunity costs of doing so, rather than spending the money on 
something else, have never been higher. The long-lasting problem of lack of information 
sharing and conflicting definitions of competencies could be revealed as something that is 
essential to address now (Boin and McConnell 2007, Ansell et al. 2010).  
  
7. Conclusions  
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This paper has suggested that the technological component of CI accumulates vulnerabilities 
which could be coincident between natural and human-made risks, and that this could be a 
source of escalation in cascading disasters. We analysed possible triggers, such as extreme 
space weather events and cybersecurity, and demonstrated that there are common 
vulnerability paths that can compromise or challenge emergency management and planning. 
This could be common to other triggers that are unknown, or at least highly uncertain, and 
that require increased flexibility in preparedness and response by means of improved training 
and scenario building. We have argued that the consideration of two different scenarios of 
Massive, Overwhelming, Disruption of Operations (acronym M.OR.D.OR.) could be used to 
improve organizational resilience. First, the trigger events could be regarded as happening on 
their own, as in, for example, solar flares or well-targeted cyberattacks. In this case, the focus 
should be on testing the capacity to respond to secondary emergencies which are caused by 
the failure of CI. Secondly, more attention should be given to compounding events that are 
normally considered unlikely to happen. This perspective could associate well known physical 
threats (e.g. floods) to other events that are less foreseeable or that maintain higher levels of 
uncertainty, involving, for example, cyberspace and communications and causing operational 
failure of GNSS. Scenario building can help to maintain operational capacity and reassess the 
priorities for response. It can increase the capacity of the response system to adapt and be 
resilient. In both the cases, as we have explained, the scenario escalates at different scales 
and to different levels of disruption, which could require priorities, resources and information 
sharing to be reassessed in order to maintain emergency capacity during crisis. 
 
This work does not pretend to be exhaustive but aims to provide a preliminary application of 
a vulnerability scenario based on theoretical research on complex systems, such as that 
carried out by Sornette (2009), Helbing (2013), Linkov et al. (2014) and Pescaroli and 
Alexander (2016). Rather than a final product, it is an attempt to apply a new cross-
disciplinary approach to the strategies designed to organise and prepare for cascading events. 
We recognise the existence of many limitations and hope that they will be investigated in the 
future. For feasibility reasons, we have focused on the technological component of CI. 
Although we have considered the social impacts and drivers of MO.R.DO.R., future research 
should develop the common paths associated with softer infrastructures that are part of the 
social fabric.  
 
We currently lack a single answer to a very simple question: how likely is M.OR.D.OR. to 
happen? Where triggers such as high-impact extreme space weather events could happen at 
the same time as other natural hazards, cascading events must be expected to be infrequent, 
but this does not mean that such eventualities are impossible or are a case of 'crying wolf'. 
The problem may lie in how probability and risk are translated into preparedness strategies 
and policy making, which suggests that further studies are needed in order to find optimal 
training strategies for maximizing the complementarities of the different methodologies. 
Even if some of the literature suggests that current risk models could be insufficient to define 
probabilities in highly complex systems, a more refined answer could be given with the 
application of new dimensions, such as big data and neural networks. Moreover, because 
they are different in their root causes but similar in their possible escalation points, there are 
still unanswered questions about the differences between natural and human-made triggers 
and their dynamics.  
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It is perfectly possible that the evolution of cyberwarfare could lead the sort of situation 
envisaged by the M.OR.D.OR. scenario. There needs to be a common technique for defining 
escalation points and thresholds, one that is complementary to the scenario building process. 
Strategies for multidisciplinary resilience assessment of complex systems are promising here 
(Linkov et al. 2014). We need to determine the possible level of disruption that could be 
managed, in relation to both the capacity of local components and the overall level of 
interconnection among networks such as those that transmit electricity. In conclusion, for 
feasibility reasons, this paper does not include any analysis of the evolution of incidents, 
although this could be a useful tool for improving the understanding of such processes. Future 
research should better address how to reduce the vulnerabilities that are common to 
different threats. It should also model the evolution of the system and help maximize 
preparedness efforts before a triggering event. Ideally, this could be used by industry and 
policy makers to develop more resilient components of CI, by recasting the most 
interconnected and fragile nodes in a more decentralized and sustainable way.  
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policies. Zürich: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. 
 
Arquilla, J., and Ronfeldt, D. (1993). ‘Cyberwar is coming!’. Comparative Strategy, 12(2), pp. 
141-165. 
 
Alexander, D.E. (2000). ‘Scenario methodology for teaching principles of emergency 
management’. Disaster Prevention and Mangement: An International Journal, 9(2), pp.89 – 
97.  
 
Alexander, D.E. (2002). Principles of emergency planning and management. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Alexander, D.E. (2013). ‘Volcanic ash in the atmosphere and risks for civil aviation: a study in 
European crisis management’. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 4(1), pp. 9-19. 
 20 
 
Alexander, D.E. (2013b). ‘Critical infrastructure’. In K.B. Penuel, M. Statler and R. Hagen (Eds), 
Encyclopaedia of Crisis Management, Sage, Thousand Oaks, California, pp. 208-211. 
 
Alexander, D.E. (2016). How to write an emergency plan. Dunedin Academic Press, Edinburgh. 
 
Amin, M. (2002). ‘Toward secure and resilient interdependent infrastructures’. Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems, 8 (3), pp. 67–75. 
 
Ansell, C., Boin A., and Keller, A. (2010). ‘Managing transboundary crises: Identifying the 
building blocks of an effective response system’. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 18 (4), pp. 195-207. 
 
Argenti, F., Landucci, G., Reniers, G. (2016). ‘Probabilistic vulnerability assessment of chemical 
clusters subjected to external Acts of Interference’. Chem. Eng. Trans, 48, pp. 691–696. 
 
Antonioni, G., Landucci, G., Necci, A., Gheorghiu, D., Cozzani, V. (2015). ‘Quantitative 
assessment of risk due to NaTech scenarios caused by floods’. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 142, pp. 334–345. 
 
Birkmann, J., Kienberger, S., and Alexander, D.E. (2014). Assessment of vulnerability to natural 
hazards- An European perspective. Elsevier, San Diego, CA.  
 
Blake, E.S., Kimberlain, T.B., Berg, R.J., Cangialosi, J.P., and Beven, J.L. (2013). Tropical cyclone 
report Hurricane Sandy (AL182012), 11-29 October 2012. National Hurricane Centre, Miami, 
Florida. 
 
Boin, A., and Mc Connell, A. (2007). ‘Preparing for critical infrastructure breakdowns: The 
limits of crisis management and the need for resilience’. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 15(1), pp. 50-59. 
Buckerfield de la Roche, A. (2013). ‘The merger of two global commons: the need for new 
governance’. Space Policy, 29(2), pp. 159-163. 
Cannon, P., Angling, M., Barclay, L., Curry, C., Dyer, C., Edwards, R., Greene, G., Hapgood, M., 
Horne, R.B., Jackson, D., Mitchell, C.N., Owen, J., Richards, A., Rodgers, C., Ryden, K., 
Saunders, S., Sweeting, M., Tanner, R., Thomson, A. & Underwood, C. (2013), Extreme space 
weather: impacts on engineered systems and infrastructure. Royal Academy of Engineering, 
London. 
 
Cliver, E. W., and Dietrich, W. F., (2013). ‘The 1859 space weather event revisited: limits of 
extreme activity’. J. Space Weather Space Clim., A31, pp. 2-15. 
 
Chai, C. L., Liu, X., Zhang, W.J., Deters, R., Liu, D., Dyachuk, D., Tu, Y.L., and Baber, Z. (2008). 
‘Social network analysis of the vulnerabilities of interdependent critical infrastructures’. 
International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 4(3), pp. 256–273.  
 
 21 
Clarke, R. A., and Knake, R. K. (2011). Cyber war. HarperCollins, New York. 
 
Crane, L. (2017). The Sun just belched out the strongest solar flare in 12 years. New Scientist, 
06/09/2017, www.newscientist.com (accessed 08/09/2017) 
 
De Groeve, T., Annunziato, A. , Vernaccini, L., Salamon, P. , Thielen, J., San Miguel, J., Camia, 
A., Vogt, J. , Krausmann, E., Wood, M., Guagnini, E., Giannopoulos, G., Pursiainen, C., and 
Gattinesi, P. (2013). Overview of disaster risks that the EU faces. European Commission, JRC 
Scientific and Policy Reports. Joint Research Centre, Ispra. 
 
De Bruijne, M., and van Eeten, M. (2007). ‘Systems that should have failed: Critical 
infrastructure protection in an institutionally fragmented environment’. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 15(1), pp. 18-29. 
 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2015). Space weather preparedness strategy. 
Version 2.1. Ref: BIS/15/457, www.gov.uk (accessed 04/10/2016). 
 
Dobbins, R. W., and Schriiver, K. (2015). Electrical Claims and Space Weather Measuring the 
visible effects of an invisible force. Zurich Insurance Group Ltd., Zurich. 
 
Eastwood, J. P. (2008). ‘The science of space weather’. Phil. Trans. R. Soc., 366, pp. 4489–
4500. 
 
Egan, M. J. (2007). ‘Anticipating future vulnerability: defining characteristics of increasingly 
critical infrastructure –like systems’. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 15(1), 
pp. 1-17. 
 
Field, C. B., Barros, V., Stocker, T. F., and Dahe, Q. (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Forbes, K. F., and Cyr, O. C. St. (2012). ‘Did geomagnetic activity challenge electric power 
reliability during solar cycle 23? Evidence from the PJM regional transmission organization in 
North America’. Space Weather, 10(5), pp. 1-14. 
 
Fry, E. K. (2012). ‘The risks and impacts of space weather: Policy recommendations and 
initiatives’. Space Policy , 28, pp. 180-184. 
 
Gaunt, C. T., and Coetzee, G. (2007). ‘Transformer failures in regions incorrectly considered 
to have low GIC-risk’. IEEE Powertech Conference, 978-1-4244-2190-9, pp. 807-812. 
Giacomello, G. (2004). ‘Bangs for the buck: A cost-benefit analysis of cyberterrorism’. Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(5), pp. 387-408. 
 
Giacomello, G. (Ed.) (2013). Security in cyberspace: Targeting nations, infrastructures, 
individuals. Bloomsbury Books, New York. 
 
 22 
Giannopoulos, G., Filippini, R., and Schimmer, M. (2012). Risk assessment methodologies for 
critical infrastructure protection. Part I: A state of the art, European Commission Joint 
Research Centre, Ispra. 
 
Gill, J.C., and Malamud, B.D. (2014). ‘Reviewing and visualizing the interactions of natural 
hazards’. Reviews of Geophysics, 52 (4), pp. 1–43.  
Gill, J.C., and Malamud, B.D. (2016). ‘Hazard Interactions and Interaction Networks (Cascades) 
within Multi-Hazard Methodologies’. Earth System Dynamics,7,pp. 659-679  
 
Hapgood, M. (2010). ‘Towards a scientific understanding and the risk from extreme space 
weather’. Advances in Space Research, 47 (12), pp. 2059–2072. 
 
Hapgood, M., and Thomson, A. (2010). Space weather: it’s impact on Earth and implications 
for business. Lloyds 360 Risk Insight, www.lloyds.com (accessed 16/06/2017). 
 
Hassel, H., Johansson, J., Cedergren, A., Svegrup, L., and Arvidsson, B. (2014). ‘Method to 
study cascading effects’. CascEff project, D2.1, www.casceff.eu (accessed 16/06/2017). 
Helbing, D. (2013). ‘Globally networked risks and how to respond’. Nature, 497, pp.51–59.  
Helbing, D., Brockmann, D., Chadefaux, T., Donnay, K., Blanke, U., Woolley-Meza O., 
Moussaid, M., Johansson, A., Krause, J., Schutte, S., Perc, M. (2015). ‘Saving Human Lives: 
What Complexity Science and Information Systems can Contribute’. Journal of Statistical 
Physics, 158(3), pp. 735-781.  
Hellström, T. (2007). ‘Critical infrastructure and systemic vulnerability: towards a planning 
framework’. Safety Science, 45(3), pp. 415–430.  
Hogan M. (2013). Anytown : Final Report [Internet]. London Resilience, London, 
www.londonprepared.gov.uk (accessed 16/06/2017). 
Jarvis, L., Macdonald, S., and Nouri L. (2014). ‘The cyberterrorism threat: Findings from a 
survey of researchers’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37(1), pp. 68-90. 
 
Kappenman, J. G. (2005). ‘An overview of the impulsive geomagnetic field disturbances and 
power grid impacts associated with the violent Sun-Earth connection events of 29--31 
October 2003 and a comparative evaluation with other contemporary storms’. Space 
Weather, 3 (S08C01), pp. 1-21. 
 
Kilpua, E. K. J., Olspert, N., Grigorievskiy, A., Käpylä, M. J., Tanskanen, E. I., Miyahara, H., 
Kataoka, R., Pelt, J., and Liu, Y. D. (2015). ‘Statistical Study of Strong and Extreme Geomagnetic 
Disturbances and Solar Cycle Characteristics’. The Astrophysical Journal, 806 (2), 272, pp. 1-7. 
 
Leonard, M., Westra, S., Phatak, A., Lambert, M., Van den Hurk, B., McInnes, K., Risbey, J., 
Schuster, S., Jakob, D., and Stafford-Smith, M.A (2014). ‘A compound event framework for 
understanding extreme impacts’. WIREs Clim Change, 5, pp.113–128 
 23 
Lazari, A. (2014). European Critical Infrastructure Protection. Springer, London  
 
Libicki, M. C. (2009). Cyberdeterrence and cyberwar. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 
 
Livingstone, D., and Lewis, P. (2016). Space: the final frontier for cybersecurity?. The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London. 
Linkov, I.,Bridges, T., Creutzig, F., Decker, J., Fox-lent, C., et al. (2014) ‘Changing the resilience 
paradigm’. Nature Climate Change, 4, pp. 407-409. 
 
Luiijf, E., Nieuwenhuijs, A., Klaver, M., Van Eeten, M., and Cruz, E. (2009). ‘Empirical findings 
on critical infrastructure dependencies in Europe’. In R. Setola and S. Geretshuber (Eds): 
CRITIS 2008, LNCS 5508, pp. 302–310. 
 
Little, R.G. (2002). ‘Controlling cascading failure: understanding the vulnerabilities of 
interconnected infrastructures’. Journal of Urban Technology, 9 (1), pp. 109-123. 
 
Marsh, R. T. (1997). Critical foundations: Protecting America's infrastructures. President's 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). October, Washington DC, 
www.fas.org (accessed 04/10/2016). 
 
Matusitz, J., and Minei, E. (2009). ‘Cyberterrorism: Its effects on health-related 
infrastructures’. Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, 2(4), pp. 161-171.  
National Diet of Japan (2012). The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission, Executive Summary. The National Diet of Japan, 
Tokio. 
 
Nieuwenhuijs A, Luiijf E, Klaver M (2008). ‘Modeling dependencies in critical infrastructures’. 
In: Goetz E, Shenoi S (eds) Critical infrastructure protection, IFIP Series, vol. 253, pp 205–214 
 
Kartez, J. D., and Lindell, M. K. (1987). ‘Planning for Uncertainty: The Case of local Disaster 
Planning’. Journal of the American Planning Association, 53(4), pp. 487-498. 
Khan, F.I., and Abbasi, S.A. (2000). ‘Studies on the probabilities and likely impacts of chains of 
accident (domino effect) in a fertilizer industry’. Process Saf. Prog, 19(1), pp. 40–56. 
Krausmann, E., Renni, E. M., Campedel, M., and Cozzani , V. (2011). ‘Industrial accidents 
triggered by earthquakes, floods and lightning: lessons learned from a database analysis’. 
Natural Hazards, 59,pp. 285–300. 
 
OECD (2011). OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, Future Global Shocks, Improving 
Risk Governance. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.  
 
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents. Living with high risk technologies. Princeton Paperbacks, 
Chichester. 
 
 24 
Pescaroli, G., and Alexander, D. E. (2015). ‘A definition of cascading disasters and cascading 
effects: Going beyond the “toppling dominos” metaphor’. Planet@Risk, Global Forum Davos, 
3(1), pp. 58-67. 
 
Pescaroli, G., and Alexander, D. E. (2016). ‘Critical infrastructure, panarchies and the 
vulnerability paths of cascading disasters’. Natural Hazards, 82(1), pp. 175-192. 
 
Pescaroli, G., Kelman, I. (2017). ‘How critical infrastructure orients international relief in 
cascading disasters’. Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management, 25(2), pp. 56 - 67. 
 
Reniers, G. (2009). ‘Man-made domino effect disasters in the chemical industry: the need for 
integrating safety and security in chemical clusters’. Disaster Advances, 2(2), pp. 3-5. 
 
Rasmussen, J. (1997). ‘Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: A modelling problem’. Safety 
Sciences, 27(2/3), pp. 183-213. 
 
Rid, T. (2013). Cyber war will not take place. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Rinaldi, S. M., Peerenboom, J. P., Kell, T. K. (2001). ‘Identifying, understanding, and analysing 
critical infrastructure interdependency’. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 21(6), pp. 11-25. 
 
Salzano E, Garcia Agreda A, Di Carluccio A, Fabbrocino G. (2009). ‘Risk assessment and early 
warning systems for industrial facilities in seismic zones’. Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety, 94, pp.1577–84. 
 
Schrijver, C. J., et al., (2015). ‘Understanding space weather to shield society: A global road 
map for 2015–2025 commissioned by COSPAR and ILWS’. Advances in Space Research, 55, 
pp. 2745–2807. 
 
Schulman, P. R., and Roe, E. (2007). ‘Designing Infrastructures : Dilemmas of Design and the 
Reliability of Critical Infrastructures’.Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Managemet, 
15(1),pp.42-49 
 
Sornette, D. (2009). ‘Dragon-Kings, Black Swans and the Prediction of Crises’. International 
Journal of Terraspace Science and Engineering, 2(1), pp. 1-18.  
 
Schwartau, W. (1994). Information warfare: Chaos on the electronic superhighway. Thunders 
Mountain Press, New York. 
 
Van Eeten, M., Nieuwenhuijs, A., Luiijf, E. , Klaver, K., and Cruz, E. (2011). ‘The state and the 
threat of cascading failure across critical infrastructures: the implication of empirical evidence 
from media incident reports’. Public Administration, 89(2), pp. 381–400. 
 
Van Staalduinen, M.A., Khan, F., Gadag, V., Reniers, G. (2017). ‘Functional quantitative 
security risk analysis (QSRA) to assist in protecting critical process infrastructure’. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 157, pp. 23-34. 
 
 25 
UK Cabinet Office (2015). National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies. UK Cabinet Office, 
Whitehall, London. 
 
Sommer, P., and Brown, I. (2011). Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk. 
IFP/WKP/FGS(2011)3, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris. 
 
Taleb, N. (2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House, 
London. 
Shaluf, I.M. (2007). ‘An overview on the technological disasters’. Disaster Prevention and 
Management, 16(3), pp. 380-390. 
 
Saul, J. (2017). ‘Global shipping feels fallout from Maersk cyber-attack’. Reuters, 29/6/2017, 
www.reuters.com (accessed 30/6/2017). 
 
Schulman, P. R., and Roe, E. (2007). ‘Designing Infrastructures : Dilemmas of Design and the 
Reliability of Critical Infrastructures’. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 15(1), 
pp.42-49. 
 
Wang, S., Hong, L., Ouyang, M., Zhang, J., and Chen, X. (2013). ‘Vulnerability analysis of 
interdependent infrastructure systems under edge attack strategies’. Safety Sciences, 51(1), 
pp. 328-337. 
i See Jordan Wirfs-Brock, “Data: Explore 15 Years Of Power Outages”, Inside Energy, August 18, 2014 available 
from <http://insideenergy.org/2014/08/18/data-explore-15-years-of-power-outages/>. 
                                                 
View publication stats
